Understanding attitudes towards congestion pricing: a latent variable investigation with data from four cities by Hess, S & Börjesson, M
This is a repository copy of Understanding attitudes towards congestion pricing: a latent 
variable investigation with data from four cities.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/108965/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Hess, S orcid.org/0000-0002-3650-2518 and Borjesson, M (2017) Understanding attitudes
towards congestion pricing: a latent variable investigation with data from four cities. 
Transportation Letters. ISSN 1942-7867 
https://doi.org/10.1080/19427867.2016.1271762
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. This is an Accepted Manuscript of
an article published by Taylor & Francis in Transportation Letters on 6 January 2017, 
available online: https://doi.org/10.1080/19427867.2016.1271762
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Unless indicated otherwise, fulltext items are protected by copyright with all rights reserved. The copyright 
exception in section 29 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 allows the making of a single copy 
solely for the purpose of non-commercial research or private study within the limits of fair dealing. The 
publisher or other rights-holder may allow further reproduction and re-use of this version - refer to the White 
Rose Research Online record for this item. Where records identify the publisher as the copyright holder, 
users can verify any specific terms of use on the publisher’s website. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
1 
 
Understanding attitudes towards congestion pricing: a latent variable 
investigation with data from four cities 
 
Stephane Hess1,2 & Maria Börjesson2 
 
1Institute for Transport Studies, University of Leeds 
2Centre for Transport Studies, KTH Stockholm 
 
Abstract 
Numerous cities around the world are considering the implementation of road pricing 
to ease urban traffic congestion, following on from the success in cities such as London 
and Singapore. However, policy makers are also all too aware of the generally negative 
public opinion towards such measures. This study makes use of data collected in four 
cities (two in Sweden, one in Finland and one in France) using a very consistent survey 
prob ǯ Ǥ  
the four cities in terms of a number of underlying attitudinal constructs that help  ǯ        Ǥ The 
similarities across cities indicate that the increase in the opinion towards congestion 
pricing once they are introduced is not primarily an effect of changes in underlying 
attitudes, changes in how the underlying attitudes influence the support for congestion 
pricing, or differences in anticipated versus experienced or perceived self-interest. 
Instead this effect seems to be caused by a status quo acceptance, tending to increase 
the support for the current situation.  
 
 
Keywords: congestion charging; pricing acceptability; road user attitudes 
 
JEL codes: R41, R42, R48 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Despite high congestion levels and strong support from transport economists, public 
opposition has prevented many cities from implementing congestion charges. One of 
the most encouraging results of the Stockholm congestion charge is therefore the 
gradual increase in public support once it was introduced in 2006. Increases in the 
support have been observed in virtually all cities where tolls or charges have been 
introduced: London (Schade & Baum, 2007), the Norwegian cities Bergen, Oslo and 
Trondheim (Tretvik, 2003), Milan (Ozer, Beria, & Pacchi, 2012), Singapore (Menon, P, & 
Kian-Keong, 2004) and Gothenburg (Börjesson and Kristoffersson 2015). There have 
also been similar experiences from the US (Anas & Lindsey, 2011). 
Previous literature explains the observed increase in support for congestion charges 
once they are introduced mainly by the hypothesis that drivers experience larger 
benefits than they expected (Goodwin, 2006). This explanation, however, is not 
supported by Börjesson et al. (2016). The key issue for understanding why the opinion 
towards charging is so unstable over time lies in understanding how it is shaped. 
Previous literature has focused on socioeconomic factors and self-interest, i.e. to what 
extent drivers benefit and lose from congestion pricing, which is largely determined by 
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the value of time, and the paid charge, but Börjesson et al. (2015) suggest that they are 
also dependent on general political attitudes and views.  Moreover, the categorization of 
explanatory variables into self-interest, socioeconomic characteristics and more general 
attitudes is not without ambiguity because they are highly interdependent (Hamilton et 
al. 2014). 
The purpose of this paper is to explore how attitudes to congesting charges are formed, 
and which factors influence them. We use data from four European cities, two with 
congestion charges and two without. We base the study on a survey conducted at one 
point in time in Stockholm, Helsinki and Lyon, and a similar two-wave survey conducted 
in Gothenburg, before and after the introduction of congestion charges (Hamilton et al., 
2014; Börjesson et al., 2016; Souche-Le Corvec et al., 2016). These cities were chosen 
because they all have some experience with proposals for congestion charges, but a 
varying degree of experience with the implementation of these proposals. When the 
survey was conducted, Helsinki was experiencing a lively debate about distance based 
road charging to reduce congestion. Lyon had congestion pricing during a short period 
in 1997 but the charges were abolished due to negative public opinion. Since the 
Gothenburg survey was conducted after the other three, it could be implemented as a 
two-wave before-and-after study that would help explore why support might increase 
after the introduction of charging.  
Among other things, respondents are asked how they would vote in a (hypothetical) 
referendum regarding congestion pricing in their city. We simultaneously model the 
effect of latent attitudes and self-interest on the opinion towards charges and the 
answer in a hypothetical referendum, and let them in turn be dependent on socio-
economic characteristics.  
Eliasson (2014) applies theories from social psychology (Heberlein, 2012) to explain 
why attitudes towards congestion charges in Stockholm, and other places, have been so 
unstable over time. These theories suggest that when asked about opinions that are not     ǯ  due to limited experience or weak emotional or 
moral values, they form an opinion based on associated well-established and moral-
based attitudes. This is applicable to congestion pricing, because many people do not 
have strong moral-based attitudes towards economic efficiency. The surveys on 
congestion pricing opinions applied in the present study are therefore designed to 
indicate underlying attitudes towards the environment, equity, taxes, public 
interventions and economic policy instruments. The surveys also include questions 
indicating socio-economic characteristics and self-interest: monthly paid charge and the 
value of time (in the two cities not having congestion charges the monthly paid charge is 
hypothetical). 
We define a model structure where the vote in the (hypothetical) referendum is 
explained by self-interest (measured as the stated (hypothetical) monthly paid charge) 
and by four latent variables indicating well-established attitudes related to 
environment, equity, taxes, public interventions and pricing. The survey 
questions indicating the established attitudes are also assumed to be explained by the 
latent variables. Factor analysis is used to indicate which questions are indicators of 
each of the four latent variables. We allow for correlation between the latent variables 
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and socioeconomic variables (income, education, gender and car-ownership), and allow 
the latent variables to, along with income, influence the value of time.          ǯ     
(which both have five possible response levels). The questions indicating the 
established attitudes have seven possible response levels and are explained by 
continuous response models, since an ordered response model would have resulted in 
an excessive number of threshold parameters. The model is estimated for each of the 
four cities and for each of the two years for Gothenburg. 
  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section presents the data, 
before we turn to factor analysis in Section 3. Section 4 discusses our model structure 
and results, and Section 5 presents some conclusions. 
2 DATA  
The analysis in this paper is based on a survey conducted in three cities (Stockholm, 
Lyon, Helsinki) in 2011, and a similar two-wave survey conducted in Gothenburg, 
before and after the introduction of congestion charges in January 2013 (November 
2012 and November 2013). The Swedish and Finish versions were mail-back postal 
surveys, whereas the French survey was a telephone survey.  In all cities a random 
sample of adult residents was recruited to take part in the survey. There are small 
deviations between the 2011 surveys to fit to the local context, and slightly larger 
adjustments in the two-wave Gothenburg survey. The Gothenburg survey is not a panel 
survey, such that the samples from the two years are independent. 
 
All 2011 surveys included a VOTE question formulated as ǲif there        ǫǳǤ In the Stockholm 
questionnaire, the existing system is presented, in the Lyon questionnaire, a 
hypothetical system similar to the Stockholm system is presented, and in the Helsinki 
questionnaire, a suggested system discussed in the public debate is presented. The 
congestion charging systems presented in the questionnaires are described in Table 1. 
  
The design of the systems varies across the cites; it is time-dependent in all cities except 
for Lyon.  In the two-wave Gothenburg survey, the existing system is presented and the 
VOTE ǲ if there was a referendum about         ǫǳ, since the main 
objective of the congestion charges was to collect revenue for financing an 
infrastructure package.     ǯ ǯǡ ǯ ǯǡǯǯǡ ǯ ǯ  ǯ ǯ   surveys. The responses to the 
question in the four cities are given in Figure 1.   
 
Table 1: Congestion charging systems presented in the surveys. 
City Stockholm Helsinki Lyon Gothenburg 
Population city 
(region) 
851,000  
(2.1 million) 
596,000  
(1.1 million) 
481,000         (2.1 
million) 
550,000            (1 
million) 
The congestion 
charging 
In/out passages 
from the inner city 
=RQH¼NP
06:00-09:00 and 
Passages in Lyon 
(except for the 
In/out passages 
from the inner city 
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systems 
described in the 
survey used in 
the hypothetical 
referendum. 
06:30-18:30. 
¼¼RU¼SHU
passage. Max 
charge per day 
DQGFDULV¼ 
Evenings, nights 
and weekends free 
of charge 
15:00-18:00;  
¼NP-15. 
=RQH¼NP
6-18. Max charge 
per day and car is 
¼(YHQLQJQLJKW
and weekend 
traffics not 
charged. 
5th and the 9th 
districts) and 
Villeurbanne 
priceGDW¼GD\
RU¼PRQWK 
Operating 24h/24 
and 7 days a 
week. 
06:00-18:30. 
¼¼RU¼
per passage. Max 
charge per day 
DQGFDULV¼ 
Evenings, nights 
and weekends free 
of charge 
 
The figure shows that the respondents in the cities having congestion charges, 
Stockholm and Gothenburg 2013, are more positive to congestion charges than the      ǯ  Ǥ  
ǡ   
respondents in favour of the charges increased from 33% to 50% (excluding the 
undecided) after congestion charges were introduced. 
 
 
Figure 1: Stated opinion to congestion charges in four cities. 
The surveys also include a number of questions designed to capture well-established 
and moral-based latent preferences or attitudes, anticipated to form or influence the 
support for congestion charges. They are related to the environment, equity, taxes, 
public interventions and economic policy instruments. Much effort was spent formulating 
the questions so that they did not directly relate to congestion charging but to more 
fundamental opinions assumed to be better developed in the respondents¶ minds and therefore 
more stable over time.  
 
For the questions indicating established attitudes, the responses are given on a seven-
point scale from disagree completely to agree completely. Questions designed to capture 
socioeconomic characteristics, asking about gender, age, household composition 
(number of adults and children in the household), income, employment status, and ȋ ? ?ǯǯǡ ? ?ǯǯǡ ? ?ǯ ? ?ǯǡ ? ?ǯ ?ǯȌ are also included.   
 
The responses to the statements designed to indicate established attitudes are summarised 
in Table 2. The responses are in general rather similar across the cities. However, there is a 
tendency for French respondents to agree more with statements raising equity concerns. The 
Swedes, and in particular respondents in Stockholm, tend to agree more with statements 
5 
 
proposing pricing as a means of allocating scarce resources. The Finnish respondents are least 
positive in relation to pricing policies. The French respondents tend to have more negative 
views of taxation, whereas the Swedes are most positive on taxation. Responses to the 
statements relating to environmental concerns are similar acrosscities . For Gothenburg, the 
average responses to all questions are in general stable between the two years. This is 
reassuring and indicates that they are indeed rather well-established stable attitudes.  
 
Self-interest with regard to congestion charging, free public transport and building 
more roads is indicated by survey questions on: value of time (this question is described 
in Section 4), number of cars available in the household (coded on a four-level scale: 0, 
1, 2, >2 cars), and trip frequencies by car, public transport and bicycle (trip frequencies 
are coded on a four-ǣ ? ?ǯǯǡ ? ?ǯǯǡ ? ?ǯǯǡ ? ?ǯǯȌǤ 
 
The survey in Lyon, Stockholm and Gothenburg also included a question about the 
number of trips per month that the respondent pays the charge (or would pay if the 
system was implemented). It is coded on a four-ǣ  ? ?ǯǯǡ  ? ?ǯ
couple of times pǯǡ ? ?ǯǯǡ ? ?ǯǯǤ             
responded would travel within the charged zones if the suggested system was 
implemented. 
 
 
Table 2. Average responses to questions aimed at capturing latent preferences (1= disagree completely, 
4=neutral, 7= disagree completely).  
 Helsinki Lyon Sthlm Gbg -12 Gbg -13 
Number of observations  
(response rate) 
1837 
(0.43) 
1178 
(0.39) 
1500 
(0.37) 
1582 
(0.40) 
1426  
(0.38) 
It is  reasonable that air tickets are more 
expensive for departures in  the peak hours 
4.2 3.5 4.6 4.5 4.6 
Charges and taxes to own, park and drive a car 
are too high 
- - - 4.9 4.7 
It is reasonable that air traffic is subject to a 
special environmental tax 
5.6 5.0 4.3 - - 
It is reasonable that a highway user charge is 
lower outside rush hours 
3.9 4.5 4.3 - - 
It is reasonable that new bridges/roads are 
financed by road user charges 
2.8 3.6 3.7 - - 
It is reasonable that charter operators raise 
prices when weather is bad 
2.2 - 2.4 2.7 2.7 
Traffic congestion is one of the worst problems 
in [city name] 
4.7 4.9 5.1 5.0 4.9 
It is fair that the authority determines who 
need to use a ferry with capacity constraints 
2.5 2.3 3.3 3.5 3.6 
It is fair to price a ferry with capacity 
constraints 
5.1 4.2 5.6 5.1 5.3 
The government should prioritize reducing 
differences between rich and poor 
5.1 5.5 4.9 5.3 5.5 
If low low-income drivers get a discount, I 
would become more positive to charging 
4.1 4.4 3.8 3.9 3.8 
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Motor traffic is a large threat to Nature 4.1 5.0 4.6 4.5 4.5 
It is reasonable that the noisiest cars and 
motorcycles are subject to a noise tax 
3.6 4.5 3.8 3.7 3.8 
It is reasonable that public transport fares are 
cheaper outside peak times 
4.1 4.7 4.7 5.1 5.1 
More resources should be used to protect the 
natural environment 
5.3 6.1 5.4 5.3 5.4 
If the revenue was used for public transport, I 
would become more positive to charging 
5.0 4.5 5.8 4.6 4.7 
Automated speed camera surveillance is a 
reasonable way to save lives in traffic 
5.7 4.4 5.5 5.4 5.5 
Taxes are too high in [country name] 5.2 5.3 4.8 4.5 4.2 
3 FACTOR ANALYSIS  
We assume that the responses to the statements in Table 2 are indicators of a set of 
latent attitudinal factors. To reduce the dimensionality of the statements in Table 2 and 
to define a set of latent attitudinal factors, a principal component analysis (PCA) with 
VARIMAX rotation was applied for each of the four cities. The PCA analysis resulted in 
four factors in all cities. In Gothenburg, the analysis resulted in the same factors for both 
survey years and we therefore pooled the data in the PCA analysis. The rotated factor 
loadings are displayed in Table 3. Only variables with factor loadings of at least 0.35 are 
used for interpretation.  
 
The resulting factors all make sense and can be interpreted as latent attitudinal factors in 
all cities. The results of the factor analysis are shown in Table 3. The first factor indicates 
environmental concerns. We refer to this factor as the Green (G) factor or the 
environmentally friendly attitude. It is also linked to support for public interventions 
(including opinions such as being in favour of speed cameras or reducing differences 
between rich and poor). The second factor indicates a positive attitude to taxation. We refer 
to this as the Tax (T) factor or the pro-taxation attitude.  In all cities, a negative attitude 
towards taxation is associated with low environmental concerns and car use.  
 
The third factor indicates equality concerns. We refer to this as the Equity (E) factor or the 
pro-equity attitude. Statements indicating concerns for equity in society are negatively 
correlated with statements proposing pricing (such as allocating the space on the ferry to 
those who are willing to pay for it). The fourth factor indicates being in favour of pricing 
external costs (such as pricing noisy vehicles) and of pricing as an allocation mechanism of 
scare resources. We refer to this as the Pricing (P) attitude or the pro-pricing attitude 
 
We stress that the factors reflect the correlation of the responses to the statements, which is 
an empirical issue. In other words, there is nothing fundamental showing that support for 
taxation is associated with low environmental concerns, but this is an empirical finding. The 
interpretation will be elaborated in the modelling section, where we will show how the 
statements factors are related to the socio-economic variables income, gender, education and 
the number of cars in the household. 
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There are not surprisingly some differences in the factors between the cities, possibly arising 
because each statement can be related to more than one established attitude. For instance, 
Statement 6 is correlated with the Pricing factor for Stockholm and Helsinki but with the 
Equity factor for Lyon, which makes sense since equity are often seen a negative effect of 
pricing policies. Moreover, Statement 14 is correlated with the Pricing in Helsinki and the 
Equity factor in Lyon. Statements 11 and 10 are correlated with in the Equity factor in two 
cities and with the Pricing factor in two cities, presumably for the same reason.  
 
Statement 7 is correlated with the Green factor in all cities but also with the Tax factor in 
Lyon and Gothenburg. This indicates that in Lyon and Gothenburg, environmental concerns 
are negatively correlated with a pro-tax attitude. Statement 12 is correlated with the Tax 
factor in Lyon and Stockholm. In Gothenburg Statement 7 is instead correlated with the Tax 
factor and Statement 12 with the Green factor. These results suggest that respondents 
opposing taxes also have fewer concerns with car use and environmental degradation. 
Statement 9 is correlated with the Equity factor in Helsinki, Stockholm and Gothenburg and 
with the Green factor in Lyon, Stockholm and Gothenburg. The correlation between 
environmental concern and left-wing attitudes (pro-equity and pro-taxation) is plausible given 
that green parties are now well established as being left-wing in all these counties.   
 
In Helsinki Statement 13 is correlated with the Tax factor, whereas it is correlated with the 
Pricing factor in the Swedish cities. Statements 16 are correlated with different factors in the 
cities (Tax, Green or Pricing factor), which makes sense since a noise tax can be associated 
with all these attitudes. 
4 JOINT MODEL FOR FORMATION AND IMPACT OF ATTITUDES 
The factor analysis work in Section 3 has highlighted the existence of key groupings of 
the 18 attitudinal questions. This suggests the presence of a number of underlying      ǯ    Ǥ  
present section, we go one step further, by investigating, in a joint model, how these 
attitudes are formed, i.e. what socio-demographic characteristics can help explain 
attitudes, and what their impact is on the answers to questions on referendum voting 
and willingness-to-pay for travel time reductions. 
4.1 Specification 
We follow the developments in Section 3 by using the same four attitudinal constructs, 
which we refer to as: 
x environmentally friendly attitude 
x pro-taxation attitude 
x pro-equity attitude 
x pro-pricing attitude 
8
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It is  reasonable that air tickets are more 
expensive for departures in  the peak hours. 
Charges and taxes to own, park and drive a car 
are too high 
It is reasonable that air traffic is subject to a 
special environmental tax 
It is reasonable that a highway user charge is 
lower outside rush hours 
It is reasonable that new bridges/roads are 
financed by road user charges 
It is reasonable that charter operators raise prices 
when weather is bad 
Traffic congestion is one of the worst problems in 
[city name] 
It is fair to price the ferry3 
It is fair that the authority determines who 
need to use the ferry 
The government should prioritize reducing 
differences between rich and poor 
If low low-income drivers get a discount, I would 
become more positive to charging 
Motor traffic is a large threat to Nature 
It is reasonable that the noisiest cars and 
motorcycles are subject to a noise tax 
It is reasonable that public transport fares are 
cheaper outside peak times 
More resources should be used to protect the 
natural environment 
If the revenue was used for public transport, I 
would become more positive to charging 
Automated speed camera surveillance is a 
reasonable way to save lives in traffic 
Taxes are too high in [country name] 
Factor 
City 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.7 
 
 
0.62 
 
0.57 
 
G 
Helsinki 
0.72 
 
0.57 
 
 
0.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.58 
T 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.49 
 
 
0.7 
0.72 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E 
 
 
 
0.75 
0.7 
 
 
0.46 
 
 
 
 
0.52 
0.59 
 
 
 
 
P 
 
 
0.58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.68 
 
0.46 
 
 
0.7 
 
 
 
G 
Lyon 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.7 
 
 
 
 
-0.43 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.71 
T 
-0.43 
 
 
 
-0.48 
 
 
-0.55 
 
 
0.5 
 
-0.52 
 
 
 
 
 
E 
0.47 
 
 
0.76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.76 
 
 
 
 
P 
 
 
0.55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.49 
 
0.79 
 
 
0.77 
0.56 
0.62 
-0.37 
G 
Stockholm 
 
 
0.39 
-0.45 
 
 
-0.67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.68 
T 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.49 
 
0.62 
0.71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E 
0.74 
 
0.36 
0.53 
 
0.73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.49 
 
 
 
 
 
P 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.56 
0.47 
 
0.47 
 
0.67 
 
 
0.65 
 
0.66 
 
G 
Gothenburg 
 
-0.82 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.36 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.88 
T 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.71 
0.47 
0.72 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E 
0.78 
 
 
 
 
0.79 
 
0.39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P 
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Let ߙ௡ǡଵ be one of the four attitudinal constructs for respondent n, say the 
environmentally friendly attitude. In common with extensive recent work in choice 
modelling (see e.g. Ben-Akiva et al., 2002; Bolduc et al., 2005), we recognise that 
attitudes themselves are not observed and hence are latent constructs, for which only 
part of the value can be attributed to observed respondent characteristics. We thus have 
that: 
 ߙ௡ǡଵ ൌ ݂ሺݖ௡ǡ ߛଵሻ ൅ ߟଵǡ    (1) 
 
where ߟଵ is a random component which follows a standard normal distribution, i.e. ߟଵ ׽ܰሺ ?ǡ ?ሻ. The first component, ݂ሺݖ௡ǡ ߛଵሻ, represents the deterministic part of the latent 
attitude, where ߛଵis a vector of estimated parameters which explain the role of a set of 
socio-demographic characteristics, ݖ௡ (through an interaction defined by the functional 
form of f(), which is typically linear), in the formation of ߙ௡ǡଵ. In our work, four socio-
demographic attributes were used for this purpose, namely: 
x income 
x gender 
x education (university degree or not) 
x number of cars in the household 
 
Income and the number of cars could influence the latent attitude through self-interest. 
For instance respondents with more cars may enjoy or rely more on driving than others 
and may therefore be less concerned about damage to the environment. The education 
attainment and gender would influence the attitudes for other reasons, such as 
experiences and understanding of the society. Of course, for car ownership, it is also 
possible that the causality goes in the opposite direction. 
 
Let us now define ܫ to be the set of attitudinal questions which have been used in the 
factor analysis, say ܫ ൌ ൏ ܫଵǡ ǥ ǡ ܫ௄ ൐. The latent variables above are then be used to 
explain the answers to these attitudinal questions. While the attitudinal questions have 
an ordered response format, the use of an ordered measurement model would, given 
the high number of levels for each indicator, have necessitated the estimation of a very 
large number of threshold parameters. For this reason, we use a continuous response 
model. 
 
We start by centering each of the attitudinal indicators on zero, i.e. subtracting the 
mean, such that, for example for respondent n, ܫ௡ǡଵᇱ ൌ ܫ௡ǡଵ െ  ܫଵഥ, where ܫଵഥ  is the sample 
mean for the first attitudinal indicator. Again using the example of ܫ௡ǡଵᇱ , we would then 
write 
  ܫ௡ǡଵᇱ ൌ ߞଵǡଵߙ௡ǡଵ ൅ ߞଵǡଶߙ௡ǡଶ ൅ ߞଵǡଷߙ௡ǡଷ ൅ ߞଵǡସߙ௡ǡସ ൅ ߦ௡ǡଵ,  (2) 
 
where ߦ௡ǡଵ is a random disturbance, with ߦ௡ǡଵ ׽ ܰሺ ?ǡ ߪଵሻ, where ߪଵ needs to be 
estimated. The estimated parameter ߞ௞ǡ௝ gives the impact of the latent variable j on the 
attitudinal indicator k, where the decision on whether to estimate a given ߞ௞ǡ௝ parameter 
as opposed to fixing it to zero is informed by the factor analysis from Section 3. In model 
estimation, we seek to maximise the likelihood of the observed value for each indicator. 
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This requires the probability of the actual observed value for a given indicator variable, 
which, under the above error assumptions, is given by 
 ܮܫ௡ǡ௞ ൌ ௘షቀ಺೙ǡೖᇲ షഅೖǡభഀ೙ǡభషഅೖǡమഀ೙ǡమషഅೖǡయഀ೙ǡయషഅೖǡరഀ೙ǡరቁమమ഑ೖమఙೖ ?ଶగ .  (3) 
 
This specification is used for the 18 different attitudinal indicators used in our study, 
not all of which apply to every dataset. In addition, the model uses the latent attitudinal ǯ described in Section 2, 
and a WTP question. The latter question is formulated as a choice to pay a charge or not 
on a hypothetical commuting trip:  
 
ǲOn your commute by car you pass a bridge crossing a river, but one day the bridge closes 
for repairs. Another bridge is available if you are willing to make a detour increasing the 
travel time by 20 minutes. Commuters also have the option to use a ferry to save these 20 
minutes. What is the maximum price you would be willing to pay for a ferry ticket?ǳ 
  ? ? ? ?ȀǤThe answer to 
the WTP question can be interpreted as a crude assessment of the value of time, and the 
resulting value of time distribution is close to that estimated in the Swedish value of 
time study (Börjesson and Eliasson, 2014). However, the response to this question can 
also be interpreted as a proxy for the willingness to pay congestion charges and not 
merely as a (neutral) WTP question. This is the main motivation for assuming that also 
the WTP question depends on the latent attitudes. 
 
Hence, for the WTP question, we have seven possible response levels, while for the 
VOTE question, there are only five. In both cases, we use an ordered response model to 
explain the answers, where with only two such dependent variables, the number of 
thresholds to estimate is manageable.  
 
In addition to using the four latent attitudes to explain the responses, we also factor in a 
direct impact of income on the WTP response, and of the anticipated frequency of toll 
payment on the VOTE response. Our rationale for not using the anticipated frequency of 
toll payment in the attitudinal constructs is that we wish them to relate to long term 
underlying attitudes. Figure 2 explains the structure of the model. 
 
Let us first define two new constructs as follows: 
 ߙ௡ǡௐ்௉ ൌ ߞௐ்௉ߙ௡ǡଵ ൅ ߞௐ்௉ߙ௡ǡଶ ൅ ߞௐ்௉ߙ௡ǡଷ ൅ ߞௐ்௉ߙ௡ǡସ ൅ ߛ௜௡௖ǡௐ்௉݅݊ܿ݋݉݁௡ ߙ௡ǡ௏ை்ா ൌ ߞ௏ை்ாߙ௡ǡଵ ൅ ߞ௏ை்ாߙ௡ǡଶ ൅ ߞ௏ை்ாߙ௡ǡଷ ൅ ߞ௏ை்ாߙ௡ǡସ ൅ ߛ௙௥௘௤ǡ௏ை்ா݂ݎ݁ݍ௡ǡ 
      (4) 
 
with ݅݊ܿ݋݉݁௡ and ݂ݎ݁ݍ௡ giving the income and anticipated toll frequency, respectively, 
for person n. 
 
Using the example of the WTP, we would then have that the probability for the actual 
observed response for respondent n is given by: 
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ܮܫ௡ǡௐ்௉ ൌ  ? ߜௐ்௉ǡ௡ǡ௦ ቀ ௘೟ೈ೅ುǡೞషഀ೙ǡೈ೅ುଵା௘೟ೈ೅ುǡೞషഀ೙ǡೈ೅ು െ ௘೟ೈ೅ುǡೞషభషഀ೙ǡೈ೅ುଵା௘೟ೈ೅ುǡೞషభషഀ೙ǡೈ೅ುቁ଻௦ୀଵ ǡ (5) 
 
where ߜௐ்௉ǡ௡ǡ௦=1 if and only if respondent n chooses answer s for the WTP question. 
The ݐௐ்௉ǡ௦ parameters are thresholds that are to be estimated, with the normalisation 
that ݐௐ்௉ǡ଴ ൌ െ ? and ݐௐ்௉ǡ଻ ൌ ൅ ?. A corresponding approach is used for the VOTE 
question, with the difference that the summation is across just five levels, and ݐ௏ை்ாǡହ ൌ൅ ?. 
 
The combined likelihood function for respondent n is now given by: 
 ܮ௡ ൌ ܮܫ௡ǡௐ்௉  ? ܮܫ௡ǡ௏ை்  ? ? ܮܫ௡ǡ௞௄௞ୀଵ    (6) 
 
The individual elements on the right hand side of this likelihood function are all 
conditional on a given value for the four attitudinal constructs ߙ௡ǡଵ to ߙ௡ǡସ. These terms 
however follow a random distribution, and the unconditional (on a given value of the 
latent variables) likelihood function is then given by: 
 ܮ௡ሺߛǡ ߞǡ ݐǡ ߪሻ ൌ ׬ ܮܫ௡ǡௐ்௉  ? ܮܫ௡ǡ௏ை்  ? ? ܮܫ௡ǡ௞௄௞ୀଵ ߶ሺߟሻ݀ߟǡఎ  (7) 
 
where ߟ is a vector comprising the four standard normally distributed error terms and 
where ߶ሺߟሻ is the associated standard normal density function. This likelihood for 
respondent n is conditional on:  
x the vectors of socio-demographic interaction parameters ߛ;  
x the parameters ߞ explaining the impact of the latent variables on the attitudinal 
indicators, the WTP and VOTE questions; 
x the threshold parameters ݐ for the ordered response model; and  
x the standard deviation parameters ߪ for the continuous response models.  
 
In model estimation, we maximise the log-likelihood function, given by: 
 ܮܮሺߛǡ ߞǡ ݐǡ ߪሻ ൌ  ?  ܮ௡ሺߛǡ ߞǡ ݐǡ ߪሻே௡ୀଵ = ?  ቀ׬ ܮܫ௡ǡௐ்௉ܮܫ௡ǡ௏ை்  ? ܮܫ௡ǡ௞௄௞ୀଵ ߶ሺߟሻ݀ߟఎ ቁே௡ୀଵ .
    (8) 
 
The integral in this likelihood function does not have a closed form solution, and 
numerical approximation is used instead, with: 
 ܵܮܮሺߛǡ ߞǡ ݐǡ ߪሻ ൌ  ?   ? ܮܫ௡ǡௐ்௉൫ߙ௡ǡ௥൯ܮܫ௡ǡ௏ை்൫ߙ௡ǡ௥൯  ? ܮܫ௡ǡ௞൫ߙ௡ǡ௥൯௄௞ୀଵோ௥ୀଵே௡ୀଵ Ǥ (9) 
 
where ߙ௡ǡ௥ is a draw from the randomly distributed ߙ௡ vector, which comprises ߙ௡ǡଵ to ߙ௡ǡସ. In model estimation, we made use of 100 Halton draws, and all models were coded 
and estimated in Ox 6.2 (Doornik, 2001). 
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Figure 2: Model structure 
4.2 Results 
Before turning to the detailed results, it is worth noting that the Gothenburg sample 
consisted of data from two years, before and after the introduction of pricing. We 
initially estimated a generic model and two year specific models. A ߯ଶ test of parameter 
restriction rejected the assumption of homogeneity in estimates across the two samples 
(LR-test value of 242.8, with a critical ߯଺ଷଶ  value of 82.53). We next allowed for separate 
effects by year (2012 and 2013) for the following components: 
 
x the impact of gender (i.e. male-female differences) on the four latent attitudes 
x the impact of the number of cars on the pro-environment attitude 
x the thresholds for the measurement model for the VOTE question 
 
After treating these parameters as year-specific, and once again conducting a  ߯ଶ test of 
parameter restriction comparing the model to one with year specific estimates for all 
parameters, we can no longer reject the assumption of homogeneity in the remaining 
parameters (LR-test value of 62.6, with a critical ߯ହସଶ  value of 72.15). The year specific 
threshold parameters take care of the more positive response to the VOTE in the 2013 
sample.  
 
The detailed estimation results are presented in Table 5. The table contains a large 
number of estimated parameters, and we see strong consistency in terms of the impacts 
of latent variables on attitudinal statements with our findings from the factor analysis. 
We thus focus instead on the role of socio-demographics in the formation of attitudes, 
and the impact of the latent attitudes on the responses to the WTP and VOTE questions. 
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These findings are summarised in Table 4 where a simplified notation is used. For 
impacts that are significant at the 99% level, we use --- and +++ for negative and 
positive impacts, respectively, with --/++ used for impacts that are significant at the 
95% level, and -/+ for impacts that are significant at the 90% level. 
 
We first see that income has a positive and significant impact on the stated WTP in all 
four cities, where this is significant at the 90% level for Helsinki, and at the 99% level in 
the remaining three cities. Similarly, the anticipated toll frequency has a negative impact 
on the response to the VOTE question, significant at the 99% level in all four cities. This 
indicates that respondents become more negative to charging the more they are 
(expecting to be) charged.  
 
Turning to the environmentally friendly attitude, across all four cities, those 
respondents with more environmentally friendly attitudes respond more positively in 
the referendum question. They also indicate a higher WTP except in Lyon, despite the 
fact that, in two of the three cities with a significant effect, they tend to have lower 
income than average. The sign of that effect is consistent with the answer to the VOTE 
question, i.e. an environmentally friendly attitude also makes the respondents more 
willing to pay a higher charge reduce their commuting time. We cannot rule out the 
possibility of some reversed causality or confounding in the relationship between the 
latent attitudes and the WTP (i.e. both WTP and the latent attitude correlate with the 
third unobserved variable). Reversed causality and confounding are however not likely 
to influence the relationship between the latent attitudes and the VOTE, given that the 
former are so stable between the years, even when the response to the VOTE becomes 
more positive. 
 
 
Table 4: Summary results for joint models 
  
impact on  
    
  
VOTE WTP 
    
In
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e
 Helsinki N/A + 
    
Stockholm N/A +++ 
    
Lyon N/A +++ 
    
Gothenburg N/A +++ 
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d
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Helsinki --- N/A 
    
Stockholm --- N/A 
    
Lyon --- N/A explanators 
Gothenburg --- N/A income female university cars 
E
N
V
IR
O
N
M
E
N
T
A
LL
Y
 
F
R
IE
N
D
LY
 
A
T
T
IT
U
D
E
 Helsinki +++ ++ --- +++     
Stockholm +++ +++ 
 
+++ +++ --- 
Lyon +++ 
  
+ 
 
  
Gothenburg +++ +++ --- 
+++ (2012)      
--- (2013) 
++ 
--- 
(2012) 
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+++ --- 
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Helsinki     --- +++     
Stockholm --- --- --- +++ 
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Lyon --- --- - +++ --   
Gothenburg     --- 
+++ (2012)  
+ (2013) 
  +++ 
P
R
O
-
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R
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G
 
A
T
T
IT
U
D
E
 Helsinki +++ +++ +       
Stockholm +++ +++ +++ --- +++ --- 
Lyon 
    
---   
Gothenburg +++ +++ +++ --- (2012) +++ --- 
 
  
We observe that higher income leads to a less environmentally friendly attitude in 
Helsinki and Gothenburg. Self-interest could play a role here, because high income 
people consume more and tend therefore to use more energy. Likewise, those with 
more cars exhibit less environmentally friendly attitudes in Stockholm and Gothenburg 
(2012 only). This effect might also arise from self-interest or being subject to reversed 
causality. The effect of self-interest on the VOTE might in this way be reinforced through 
the environmental attitude. Women overall have a more environmentally friendly 
attitude, where this is however only weakly significant in Lyon, and where, in 
Gothenburg, the trend between women and men is reversed between 2012 and 2013. 
Higher education makes respondents in Stockholm and Gothenburg more 
environmentally friendly.  
  
For the pro-taxation attitude, the impacts on the VOTE and WTP questions are 
consistent with expectation, showing, across all four cities, a more positive response to 
the VOTE question for respondents who are more pro-taxation. For the WTP question, 
there is again a positive impact in all cities except for Lyon, i.e. positive attitudes to 
taxation imply a higher willingness to pay for the ferry ticket. Higher income 
respondents in Gothenburg are more pro-taxation, while those with more cars in 
Stockholm and Helsinki are more anti-taxation. The latter suggests again that being 
negative about taxation is associated with car use as indicated by the factor analysis in 
Section 3. The impact of having more cars on the pro-taxation attitude probably also 
reinforces the effect of self-interest on the VOTE, tending to make respondents with more 
cars being less positive to charging. Women in Lyon are more anti-taxation, while except 
for Helsinki, more highly educated respondents are more pro-taxation.  
 
For the pro-equity attitude, the impact of this latent variable on the VOTE and WTP 
question is significant only in Stockholm and Lyon, where we see that respondents who 
are more pro-equity respond more negatively to the referendum question and also 
indicate a willingness to pay for the ferry ticket. We see that higher income respondents 
have a less positive attitude to equity (possibly due to self-interest), where the effect 
has a lower level of statistical significance in Lyon. The opposite applies to respondents 
with more cars in Gothenburg. Across all four cities, female respondents have a more 
positive pro-equity attitude, while, perhaps more difficult to explain, those with higher 
education in Lyon are less pro-equity. 
  
In all cities but Lyon, pro-pricing respondents give a more positive response in the 
referendum question and indicate a higher WTP. Hence, respondents with a positive 
attitude to pricing are also more inclined to pay a charge to reduce commuting time. 
However, in Lyon there is no impact of the latent attitude on the VOTE and WTP 
question in this sample. It should be noted that, in Lyon, the three attitudinal questions 
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with significant impacts by the latent attitude all related to differences in pricing 
between peak and off-peak, as opposed to pricing in general. This could be a potential 
reason for the difference in results because the suggested changing scheme in Lyon is 
not time-differentiated as in the other cities. The pro-pricing attitudes also seems to 
pick up a different effect in Lyon, with higher education making respondents respond 
more negatively to the attitudinal questions regarding peak-pricing. In the other cities 
higher education makes respondents more pro-pricing.  
 
For the two Swedish cities we see a very consistent pattern with higher income people 
more pro-pricing (also in Helsinki, albeit only significant at the 90% level), while 
respondents from households with more cars are less pro-pricing. Both effects could at 
least partly be explained by self-interest. As before, the effects on the latent attitude 
tend to reinforce the effect of self-interest on the VOTE. Male and more highly educated 
respondents are more pro-pricing.  
 
The above discussion has highlighted some key differences across the four cities, but 
has also showed strong similarities. In all cities, our results indicate how policy makers 
can increase the support for congestion charging by framing or marketing the policy in a 
certain way. For instance, our results suggest that by framing congestion pricing as a 
green policy and a pricing policy targeted specifically at reducing peak congestion 
(rather than just punishing car drivers in general or as a fiscal policy) might increase the 
support for the charges through these more stable attitudes. Likewise, designing the 
system and framing it so as to avoid negative equity effects (for instance by spending 
the revenue for subsidising lower public transport fares) could improve the attitude 
towards congestion charges. Finally, a clear message to policy makers is not to frame 
congestion charges as a fiscal policy to increase taxes.  
 
Before closing, it is worth briefly revisiting the differences between the 2012 and 2013 
surveys for Gothenburg. We noted that women (relative to men) become less 
environmentally friendly, less pro-equity but also less anti-pricing, while the 
relationship between the number cars and the environmental attitude disappears in 
2013. We noted that a ߯ଶ test of parameter restriction does not reject the assumption of 
homogeneity in the remaining parameters after treating these parameters, including the 
thresholds for the measurement model for the VOTE question, as year-specific.  This 
indicates that the latent attitudes have a similar impact on the VOTE before and after 
the introduction of the charges. However, from studying the results for thresholds in 
Table 5, we can see that the change in the threshold parameters for the measurement 
model for VOTE clearly reflects the more positive referendum answers in 2013 
compared to 2012, with a shift to the left for all thresholds. 
 
This gives an indication of the underlying driver of the more positive attitude to the 
charges. The support has not increased because the charges have been reframed or 
marked as being associated with different underlying attitudes. Instead the change in 
the threshold parameters for the measurement model for VOTE indicates that it is 
simply status quo acceptance that is driving the increased support for the charges.    
5 CONCLUSIONS 
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We find that the latent attitudes and self-interest strongly influence the support for 
congestion charges (VOTE) and the willingness to pay (WTP) a charge to reduce 
commuting time.  This supports the hypothesis from the introduction, stating that when 
respondents are asked about an opinion regarding a new issue where they do not have 
a well-developed opinion, they construct an opinion based on a set of more well-defined 
and stable latent attitudes or values and their (anticipated or experienced) self-interest. 
The hypothesis that the option towards congestion charges is a relatively shallow 
construct based on other more well-defined attitudes would also explain why the 
opinion towards congestion pricing can change so rapidly over time, as observed in 
cities introducing congestion pricing.  
 
From a policy perspective, the insight that the opinion towards congestion charges is 
formed based on a set of more well-defined and stable attitudes can be used by policy 
makers to increase the support for congestion charges by framing or marketing them in 
a favourable way. Heberlein (2012) gives a number of examples where the public 
support for a policy has been influenced by how the policy makers have framed them. 
One of the reasons for the high support for the charges in Stockholm might be the strong 
framing of them as a green policy specifically targeting peak road congestion. One 
reason for the lower support for the charges in Gothenburg might be the strong framing 
of them as a fiscal policy increasing taxation and less focus on the congestion reduction.  
 
Our factors capturing stable attitudes can also be interpreted in light of a right-left 
political spectrum, where environmentally friendly and pro-equity attitudes would be 
on the left and pro-pricing and anti-taxation attitudes on the right.  Interestingly, there 
is one attitude on the left and one on the right increasing with support for congestion 
charges, and one attitude to the left and one on the right reducing the support. This 
divide on the right-left political spectrum regarding the support for congestion pricing 
might be one reason for the difficulty of getting a majority for implementing it in most 
cities.  
 
We also find that the attitudes have consistent effects on the VOTE and on the WTP, i.e. 
respondents with a more positive opinion towards congestion pricing in their city are 
also more willing to pay a higher charge to reduce their own commuting time. We 
cannot rule out the possibility of reversed causality or confounding in the relationships 
between some of the latent attitudes and the WTP, i.e. that a high WTP makes a 
respondent more positive to pricing and taxation in general, and less concerned about 
equity issues due to self-interest. 
 
Our results further suggest that the attitudes are influenced by self-interest, for instance 
that high income respondents are more pro-pricing and less concerned about equity 
and that respondents having more cars are less concerned about environmental 
damage. The effect of self-interest on the attitudes is likely to reinforce the direct effect 
of self-interest on the opinion to congestion pricing. This implies that it is less 
meaningful trying to distinguish the impact of self-interest and latent attitudes on 
attitudes/preferences for congestion pricing. 
 
The model also shows that attitudes are not only influenced by socio-economic 
characteristics related to self-interest, such as income and number of cars in the 
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household, but also by educational attainment and gender that do not reflect self-
interest. 
 
Both attitudes and self-interest have a similar impact on the support for congestion 
pricing in all cities, although the baseline support differs considerably depending on the 
experience of congestion pricing. These impacts differ the most between Lyon and the 
other cities, possibly due to the different survey method in Lyon, but possibly also 
because the design of the proposed charging system was different in Lyon (a flat rate 
rather than a time-dependent one). The otherwise similar patterns across cities 
indicates that the increase in the opinion towards congestion charges once they are 
introduced is not primarily an effect of changes in underlying attitudes, in how the 
congestion charges are framed or marked in relations to this attitudinal values, or 
anticipated versus experienced or perceived self-interest. This effect rather seems to be 
caused by a status quo bias, tending to increase the support for the current situation in 
both situations. This conclusion is also supported by the result of the analysis of the 
Gothenburg samples, showing that the main difference between the two yearly samples 
before and after introduction of congestion charges, 2012 and 2013, is a shift in the 
baseline VOTE intention, but that the effect of the attitudes and (anticipated or 
experienced) self-interest on the VOTE otherwise remained relatively stable.  
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Table 5: Detailed estimation results for joint models 
  
 
Helsinki Stockholm Lyon Gothenburg 
  
Respondents 1,178 1,837 1,500 3,111 
  
Final LL -36,359.90 -52,512.80 -42,313.80 -75,471.00 
  
         
  
 
est. rob. t-rat. est. rob. t-rat. est. rob. t-rat. est. rob. t-rat. 
  
impact of income on WTP 0.0887 1.76 0.0143 3.67 0.1656 3.69 0.0127 4.20 
  
impact of anticipated toll frequency on VOTE -0.0138 -5.73 -0.0314 -3.15 -0.0593 -6.11 -0.0404 -7.68 
  
impact on VOTE for frequency non-reporters 0.3986 2.14 0.0000 - 0.0000 -     
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It would be reasonable if air traffic was subject to a special environmental tax     1.0448 17.97 0.7538 7.71     
Traffic congestion is one of the worst problems in [city name]             0.7328 15.93 
It is fair to price the ferry             0.2057 3.89 
The government should prioritize reducing differences between rich and poor     0.8359 13.44 0.6957 8.42 0.7424 16.64 
Motor traffic is a large threat to Nature 1.1649 18.22 1.2329 27.07 0.7106 9.64 1.2149 27.27 
More resources should be used to protect the natural environment 0.8167 14.38 1.1147 22.62 0.7135 12.38 1.0261 27.32 
I the revenue was used for public transport, I would be more positive to congest. charging     0.8002 16.34     
 
  
Automated speed camera surveillance is a reasonable way to save lives in traffic 0.7641 11.65 0.8004 15.51     0.8828 19.74 
Taxes are too high in [country name]     -0.6311 -10.56     
 
  
impact of latent variable on VOTE 0.8354 7.62 1.2198 13.21 0.8086 5.91 0.7771 11.13 
impact of latent variable on WTP 0.1738 1.98 0.1998 3.44 -0.0754 -1.03 0.2525 4.89 
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income -0.1166 -4.71 -0.0029 -1.36 -0.0393 -1.39 -0.0038 -1.95 
female (all datasets except 2013 sample for Gothenburg) 0.6150 7.67 0.4018 7.24 0.1090 1.64 0.4574 7.47 
female (only for 2013 sample for Gothenburg)             -0.2307 -3.26 
university educated -0.1139 -1.26 0.1599 2.69 -0.0149 -0.17 0.0676 1.31 
number of cars in household (all datasets except 2013 sample for Gothenburg) 0.0039 0.92 -0.1460 -4.70 0.0018 0.45 -0.1298 -4.40 
number of cars in household (only for 2013 sample for Gothenburg)             0.0279 1.03 
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 I would be reasonable if air tickets are more expensive for departures in  the peak hours 1.1923 8.58             
It would be reasonable if air traffic was subject to a special environmental tax 0.5352 6.83 0.5409 8.39     
 
  
It is reasonable that a highway user charge is lower outside rush hours     -0.5106 -6.50     
 
  
Charges and taxes to own, park and drive a car are too high             -1.6491 -49.00 
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Charter operator raises its prices when weather is bad 0.6953 6.78         
 
  
Traffic congestion is one of the worst problems in [city name]     -0.6532 -11.03 -0.7659 -10.40 
 
  
Motor traffic is a large threat to Nature         -0.4863 -6.36 0.4602 12.52 
Taxes are too high in [country name] -0.7051 -6.55 -1.2593 -18.59 -0.9531 -11.87 -1.4023 -37.79 
impact of latent variable on VOTE 0.4714 3.81 0.6485 8.19 0.3613 2.92 1.1336 20.07 
impact of latent variable on WTP 0.4262 3.61 0.2025 2.84 0.0806 1.14 0.4999 11.25 
im
p
a
ct
 o
f 
so
ci
o
-
d
e
m
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
s 
o
n
 
la
te
n
t 
va
ri
a
b
le
 income 0.0183 0.60 0.0003 0.11 0.0254 0.79 0.0091 4.66 
female (all datasets except 2013 sample for Gothenburg) -0.1379 -1.46 -0.0780 -1.16 -0.5074 -6.65 -0.0326 -0.66 
female (only for 2013 sample for Gothenburg)             -0.0087 -0.15 
university educated 0.1329 1.24 0.4816 5.89 0.6596 7.17 0.6103 11.40 
number of cars in household -0.0068 -1.21 -0.1141 -3.03 -0.0059 -1.26 -0.2712 -11.33 
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I would be reasonable if air tickets are more expensive for departures in  the peak hours         -0.5621 -7.43 
 
  
It would be reasonable if new bridges/roads were financed by road user charges         -0.7149 -9.45 
 
  
Traffic congestion is one of the worst problems in [city name] 0.5888 8.22         
 
  
It is fair that the authority determines who need to use the ferry             0.6682 9.38 
It is fair to price the ferry     -0.3682 -4.91 -1.0253 -13.35 
 
  
The government should prioritize reducing differences between rich and poor 1.0428 12.42 0.9252 11.22     0.6435 11.77 
If low low-income drivers get a discount, I would be more positive to congest. charging 0.9302 14.19 0.8611 11.99 0.2976 8.56 1.1625 15.32 
It would be reasonable if the noisiest cars and motorcycles were subject to a noise tax         -0.7341 -9.54 
 
  
impact of latent variable on VOTE 0.1534 1.54 -0.2377 -2.41 -1.8702 -7.99 -0.0292 -0.41 
impact of latent variable on WTP -0.1305 -1.47 -0.2886 -3.34 -0.6818 -7.87 0.0942 1.45 
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 income -0.2110 -6.58 -0.0152 -4.98 -0.0464 -1.71 -0.0164 -5.98 
female (all datasets except 2013 sample for Gothenburg) 0.6087 6.56 0.2995 3.71 0.1688 2.91 0.2689 3.77 
female (only for 2013 sample for Gothenburg)             0.1388 1.87 
university educated 0.1050 0.95 0.0378 0.45 -0.1432 -1.95 0.0622 0.94 
number of cars in household -0.0038 -0.61 0.0654 1.62 0.0013 0.32 0.0828 2.49 
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 I would be reasonable if air tickets are more expensive for departures in  the peak hours     1.2011 17.85 0.4844 5.98 1.2599 25.34 
It would be reasonable if air traffic was subject to a special environmental tax     0.5658 9.17     
 
  
It is reasonable that a highway user charge is lower outside rush hours 1.4952 15.91 0.6521 9.34 1.2317 10.48 
 
  
It would be reasonable if new bridges/roads were financed by road user charges 1.3176 17.39         
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Charter operator raises its prices when weather is bad     0.9871 17.76     1.1383 23.66 
It is fair to price the ferry 0.6487 8.29         0.3465 6.43 
It would be reasonable if the noisiest cars and motorcycles were subject to a noise tax 1.0057 11.91 0.7151 10.25     
 
  
It would be reasonable if public transport fares were cheaper outside peak times 0.8127 7.84     1.4820 10.40 
 
  
impact of latent variable on VOTE 1.1186 9.70 0.6267 8.15 0.0420 0.46 0.4146 6.84 
impact of latent variable on WTP 0.5735 6.26 0.5006 7.02 0.0238 0.35 0.4571 7.64 
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 income 0.0435 1.84 0.0129 5.48 0.0193 0.79 0.0123 5.45 
female (all datasets except 2013 sample for Gothenburg) -0.0458 -0.70 -0.3930 -6.11 0.0477 0.82 -0.2544 -4.16 
female (only for 2013 sample for Gothenburg)             0.0425 0.62 
university educated -0.0683 -0.80 0.4336 5.85 -0.2478 -3.55 0.4468 7.40 
number of cars in household 0.0014 0.36 -0.1832 -5.36 0.0012 0.34 -0.2268 -7.96 
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threshold 1 (all datasets except 2013 sample for Gothenburg) -1.0252 -9.47 -2.6724 -26.14 -1.0070 -7.57 -1.4917 -17.16 
threshold 2 (all datasets except 2013 sample for Gothenburg) 0.2738 2.54 -1.4884 -19.13 0.8780 6.89 -0.0059 -0.07 
threshold 3 (all datasets except 2013 sample for Gothenburg) 1.0000 8.60 -0.5147 -7.22 1.0115 7.68 0.9108 10.82 
threshold 4 (all datasets except 2013 sample for Gothenburg) 3.1070 17.41 1.2239 14.75 3.4549 11.83 2.8156 24.14 
threshold 1 (only for 2013 sample for Gothenburg)             -2.0881 -23.04 
threshold 2 (only for 2013 sample for Gothenburg)             -0.6922 -8.95 
threshold 3 (only for 2013 sample for Gothenburg)             0.2816 3.61 
threshold 4 (only for 2013 sample for Gothenburg)             2.0006 19.85 
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threshold 1 -0.6413 -4.48 -1.3765 -10.89 -0.1070 -1.17 -0.9211 -10.52 
threshold 2 0.6408 4.53 0.0412 0.36 1.0467 10.96 0.6828 8.03 
threshold 3 2.1391 13.46 1.6750 14.14 2.4315 20.12 2.3069 24.26 
threshold 4 3.2272 17.54 2.7226 20.88 3.4948 22.71 3.3726 29.60 
threshold 5 3.6615 18.42 3.3090 23.22 3.9205 22.20 4.0834 30.02 
threshold 6 5.8337 13.87 4.4408 24.49 5.9125 15.07 5.1435 27.14 
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I would be reasonable if air tickets are more expensive for departures in  the peak hours 1.6391 18.33 1.6750 36.10 1.9760 59.06 1.6403 45.61 
It would be reasonable if air traffic was subject to a special environmental tax 1.4112 31.01 1.5954 43.52 1.8675 40.36 
 
  
It is reasonable that a highway user charge is lower outside rush hours 1.7122 23.65 2.0221 55.89 1.7628 21.77 
 
  
It would be reasonable if new bridges/roads were financed by road user charges 1.4291 24.72     1.9323 56.93 
 
  
Charges and taxes to own, park and drive a car are too high             1.0495 30.24 
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Charter operator raises its prices when weather is bad 1.4927 30.38 1.6555 43.33     1.6445 49.04 
Traffic congestion is one of the worst problems in [city name] 1.6889 48.43 1.6041 47.88 1.5173 33.69 1.7189 74.20 
It is fair that the authority determines who need to use the ferry             2.0528 72.56 
It is fair to price the ferry 1.8154 46.83 1.7127 45.69 2.0855 51.97 1.9106 78.07 
The government should prioritize reducing differences between rich and poor 1.4980 24.51 1.3960 24.58 1.6610 37.37 1.4321 48.35 
If low low-income drivers get a discount, I would be more positive to congest. charging 1.5354 33.44 1.5045 36.13 0.9562 56.31 1.6376 31.89 
Motor traffic is a large threat to Nature 1.3444 25.58 1.3405 35.54 1.4577 31.72 1.3350 41.80 
It would be reasonable if the noisiest cars and motorcycles were subject to a noise tax 1.9722 46.80 2.1497 68.11 2.1145 63.47 
 
  
It would be reasonable if public transport fares were cheaper outside peak times 2.0579 48.89     1.5912 12.82 
 
  
More resources should be used to protect the natural environment 1.2728 32.70 1.0952 30.48 1.0651 25.99 1.1936 46.66 
I the revenue was used for public transport, I would be more positive to congest. charging     1.3450 39.59     
 
  
Automated speed camera surveillance is a reasonable way to save lives in traffic 1.6068 35.75 1.5166 46.81     1.5407 56.78 
Taxes are too high in [country name] 1.6393 33.19 1.4700 28.82 1.6476 31.34 1.5240 50.04 
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